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December Ramblings

I apologize for the gap in blog entries since my Thanksgiving post.

So, anyway… Lisa (my webmaster) scrunched my TAS Skull Guy with my favorite Overloaded-AR pic and hung some Christmas lights on it, and I think it looks pretty damn festive! (Nothing like a skeletal zombie with a Santa cap and locked-and-loaded AR to remind you of the Yuletide spirit, right?). Then she hung some falling snowflakes for me. Not too shabby! Only problem is, since we activated my website snowflakes, we’ve had 18 freakin’ inches of snow in East Central Wisconsin!  (Coincidence? …. or psychic phenomenon?)

Yeah, right. This is Wisconsin. It snows here. A LOT. Let’s move on.

Training issues are paramount right now. We are reading a LOT of stuff from people in the Sandbox and in Intel that suggest that there will be terrorist activity inside the CONUS sooner rather than later. Our recent presidential election  has encouraged the Hadjis to believe that our response to terrorism will be muted, if not null and void. Who knows? I will state at the outset that I have zero confidence in Barry Obama’s ability to lead American warriors. Zero.

Anyway, my greatest concern, as always, is training our Good Guys where to place their bullets so they can terminate the fight as early as possible. This is not an academic exercise. I repeat: THIS IS NOT AN ACADEMIC EXERCISE. 

I have been a hunter my entire life. At no time in my hunting career did any of my mentors tell me that it was OK just to wound or cripple an animal. Why not? Because they knew that a crippled or wounded animal would live on and it would be harder to harvest. And while I have limited personal experience in hunting dangerous game (i.e., animals that fight back more often than not unless incapacitated early in the fight), the imperative is clearly to put your quarry down before he puts you down.  Well, guess what. If we train LE/Military personnel to just shoot a Hadji anywhere, as we are apparently doing, we are going to have the same damn problem.

What we have to do is train our people to shoot the "good stuff". It’s not an academic exercise. It’s survival training.

If your survival depends on you killing a moose for your winter’s meat, learning to kill moose is survival training. I learned almost 30 years ago where the vital anatomy is in a bull moose, and that a bull moose will provide more than enough meat for a young family for a year. Such food surplus may make the difference between survival an annihilation. If your survival depends upon you killing the predator before he kills and eats you and your family, that’s an imperative of a higher order.

If your survival depends on dropping Hadjis to the turf, it’s survival training of a different sort, but it’s still survival training.  Either way, you need to learn how to place your shots where they need to go. This is what Tactical Anatomy is all about.

Two weeks ago a gang of lowlife Hadji scum terrorized Bombay, India (sorry, for you politically correct types, that would be Mumbai), wounding and killing hundreds of people. No disrespect intended, but the cops who responded to the call were woefully inadequately equpped to deal with the problem. They lacked the training, the weapons, the ammo, the comms, the… you name it. 

Could that happen here in America? You bet it could. Do we have the means to defeat such attacks? Perhaps. Fewer than 40% of American police patrol cars have rifles in them. From what I am aware, fewer than 10% of American patrol cops have training in fighting with their patrol rifles. And NO ONE is training American cops in any kind of two-man team fighting, the kind of fighting the Bombay cops desperately needed. There are people ready to start that training, and moreover, there are trainers ready to conduct that training.

Learn what you need to learn.

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“Buddy-Team” Tactics


"Buddy-team" Terrorist Tactics at Mumbai


This link to this article written by a U.S. Marine officer was sent to me by email. I believe there is enormous tactical value in this article:

From what I can gather there are a few interesting observations to be made of the tactics in use in Mumbai:

It appears the attackers were organized into buddy pairs, allowing one to shoot while the other moved, and so forth. Interestingly, the buddy pair has is a later innovation in small unit tactics and has only been slow to trickle through regular infantry formations. In World War I, the smallest element of maneuver (on paper) might have been a battalion or company. The Germans, in developing “storm troop tactics” then innovated even smaller maneuver elements, which we might call squads today. The role of platoons and squads became only greater in WWII. After WWII, General S.L.A. Marshall conducted a massive study of the reactions of men in combat (See “Men Against Fire”) and the result of his work was the genesis of the Fire Team. The Fire Team is now the smallest doctrinal unit of maneuver in the US military. In the Marine Corps, it is led by a Corporal, includes an automatic rifleman with a Squad Automatic Weapon, and two more riflemen.

During the Iraq War, two innovations have taken place: first, within the Marine Corps, the concept of the “buddy pair” or “buddy team” has spread dramatically, though it is still not doctrinal (it should be). The idea may have begun in the special forces, though I am not sure. The advantage of smaller and smaller units of maneuver is that if they rehearse their actions and build cohesion within the unit, they develop ever greater levels of capability *at that level*. A well-trained buddy pair with the right mindset and enough ammo can take over a city block, house by house, while under fire. The other innovation that has taken place in Iraq is to take the Fire Team and make it into a motorized element, inside one vehicle. This is less in favor now that everyone realizes that moving around in vehicles makes you seem more like robots to the locals and they then have less of a problem with killing you. In any case, all of these changes have one large thing in common — a decentralizing of decisionmaking and maneuver.


And now in Mumbai it would seem we have seen the ultimate result: autonomous buddy-pairs, with a great deal of rehearsals and navigation practice, each with its own set of goals, possibly redundant comms with brevity codes. I would imagine that each team had multiple preplanned routes to each of its objectives before they finally converged on the location for the last stand. Along the way, as some have wondered, they may have stopped for quick logistics reloads of ammo and water.

Here are some thoughts, in no order:

1. The school shooting at Columbine springs to mind when looking for analogies.

2. One of the advantages of a buddy pair, as mentioned above, is the ability to fire and move. One fires while the other moves, and then they switch. In this way, moving from cover to cover, they take ground. But this concept becomes interesting when considered against the fact that the terrorists seemingly had no one firing against them, and they did not have to disciplined in taking well-aimed shots . . .

3. . . . A photographer noted how “cool” and “professional” they looked as they sprayed from the hip. Shooting from the hip is not extremely professional, but this only is if one wants to take well-aimed shots. Perhaps shooting from the hip is very professional if one wants to spray in across a broad angle while maintaining a wider field of view than if behind the sights of your weapon. In other words, if facing no armed opposition, you have the luxury of spraying broadly, and the most dangerous thing to you is an armed threat that comes from outside your narrowed peripheral vision while using your iron sights.

4. Note this sentence, from the AP article: “They weren’t aiming at anyone in particular. It was like they wanted to empty their magazines and do as much damage here as possible before heading to the Taj,” I would argue that the terrorists, while being superbly motivated, and having planned intricately for their assault, are nevertheless poor marksmen. Given the details that we are learning of their attack, the most surprising thing is that more people weren’t killed.

5. It seems that there is a convergence taking place within the realm of small-unit tactics. Infantry units, terrorists, police forces, criminal and narco-gangs, and so forth are all converging in terms of the tactics they use against one another. The only tactical difference between 5 terrorist buddy pairs and a Marine rifle squad is their goal: the former seeks a position to create the most carnage indiscriminately for the longest period of time while the latter might be sweeping or clearing an area or conducting a manhunt, meaning it seeks to use the utmost precision in its application of force. If I may presume: the terrorists have learned fire and movement from us, from watching us, and from reading our manuals, which are posted online. But our tactics are not geared toward indiscriminate slaughter. The question is, will they develop any tactical innovations that allow them that advantage?


I’ve received email requests to show a YouTube clip of the Val Kilmer/Robert de Niro “buddy pair” from Heat, which illustrates the concept of mutual support. — W.


I am intrigued by the inclusion of the "buddy-team" you-tube clip from the movie HEAT with this article. I have been showing the HEAT video clip to my law enforcement classes for several years.

Initially my emphasis was solely to demonstrate the fundamental need for precision shot placement, which is the core of my training program. In the clip this is demonstrated by the Kilmer and DeNiro characters initially, then subsequently by the Pacino character on Sizemore. But about a year ago the effectiveness of the disciplined DeNiro/Kilmer "buddy-team" against a numerically overwhelming but disorganized police force hit me like a brick between the eyes. Since then I have been emphasizing to everyone I train that we in law enforcement have an urgent need to train our people for rehearsed as well as extemporaneous "buddy-team" fighting because whether the offenders are a pair of disaffected teens, armed bank robbers, or jihadist terrorists, the tactics required to counter the threat are EXACTLY THE SAME.

The final point I would make is that unlike military units, law enforcement personnel face a much higher probability that dealing with an active shooter(s) situation will require them to fight alongside a person who is not their dedicated "buddy-team" partner; in fact, they may have never met before, may not have commonality of weapons, or even of ammunition! To make this work on any level–national, state, or regional–presents us with a daunting task. This sort of preparedness requires a high degree of commonality of training within and between agencies such that any two officers responding to an active shooter call can rapidly default to the same base rules of engagement and comms and proceed forthwith.

American law enforcement needs to be moving in this direction. Much as I want to believe that our local, state, and federal agencies will rise to the occasion, experience has taught me that institutional inertia (the resistance of large organizations to change) will preclude such a move. It is up to the rank and file, the Warriors who have chosen to Protect and Serve, to recognize the need for this level of preparedness. They will need to forge alliances, form training programs at a grassroots level, and implement that training.

The alternative is annihilation.