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“Buddy-Team” Tactics


"Buddy-team" Terrorist Tactics at Mumbai


This link to this article written by a U.S. Marine officer was sent to me by email. I believe there is enormous tactical value in this article:

From what I can gather there are a few interesting observations to be made of the tactics in use in Mumbai:

It appears the attackers were organized into buddy pairs, allowing one to shoot while the other moved, and so forth. Interestingly, the buddy pair has is a later innovation in small unit tactics and has only been slow to trickle through regular infantry formations. In World War I, the smallest element of maneuver (on paper) might have been a battalion or company. The Germans, in developing “storm troop tactics” then innovated even smaller maneuver elements, which we might call squads today. The role of platoons and squads became only greater in WWII. After WWII, General S.L.A. Marshall conducted a massive study of the reactions of men in combat (See “Men Against Fire”) and the result of his work was the genesis of the Fire Team. The Fire Team is now the smallest doctrinal unit of maneuver in the US military. In the Marine Corps, it is led by a Corporal, includes an automatic rifleman with a Squad Automatic Weapon, and two more riflemen.

During the Iraq War, two innovations have taken place: first, within the Marine Corps, the concept of the “buddy pair” or “buddy team” has spread dramatically, though it is still not doctrinal (it should be). The idea may have begun in the special forces, though I am not sure. The advantage of smaller and smaller units of maneuver is that if they rehearse their actions and build cohesion within the unit, they develop ever greater levels of capability *at that level*. A well-trained buddy pair with the right mindset and enough ammo can take over a city block, house by house, while under fire. The other innovation that has taken place in Iraq is to take the Fire Team and make it into a motorized element, inside one vehicle. This is less in favor now that everyone realizes that moving around in vehicles makes you seem more like robots to the locals and they then have less of a problem with killing you. In any case, all of these changes have one large thing in common — a decentralizing of decisionmaking and maneuver.


And now in Mumbai it would seem we have seen the ultimate result: autonomous buddy-pairs, with a great deal of rehearsals and navigation practice, each with its own set of goals, possibly redundant comms with brevity codes. I would imagine that each team had multiple preplanned routes to each of its objectives before they finally converged on the location for the last stand. Along the way, as some have wondered, they may have stopped for quick logistics reloads of ammo and water.

Here are some thoughts, in no order:

1. The school shooting at Columbine springs to mind when looking for analogies.

2. One of the advantages of a buddy pair, as mentioned above, is the ability to fire and move. One fires while the other moves, and then they switch. In this way, moving from cover to cover, they take ground. But this concept becomes interesting when considered against the fact that the terrorists seemingly had no one firing against them, and they did not have to disciplined in taking well-aimed shots . . .

3. . . . A photographer noted how “cool” and “professional” they looked as they sprayed from the hip. Shooting from the hip is not extremely professional, but this only is if one wants to take well-aimed shots. Perhaps shooting from the hip is very professional if one wants to spray in across a broad angle while maintaining a wider field of view than if behind the sights of your weapon. In other words, if facing no armed opposition, you have the luxury of spraying broadly, and the most dangerous thing to you is an armed threat that comes from outside your narrowed peripheral vision while using your iron sights.

4. Note this sentence, from the AP article: “They weren’t aiming at anyone in particular. It was like they wanted to empty their magazines and do as much damage here as possible before heading to the Taj,” I would argue that the terrorists, while being superbly motivated, and having planned intricately for their assault, are nevertheless poor marksmen. Given the details that we are learning of their attack, the most surprising thing is that more people weren’t killed.

5. It seems that there is a convergence taking place within the realm of small-unit tactics. Infantry units, terrorists, police forces, criminal and narco-gangs, and so forth are all converging in terms of the tactics they use against one another. The only tactical difference between 5 terrorist buddy pairs and a Marine rifle squad is their goal: the former seeks a position to create the most carnage indiscriminately for the longest period of time while the latter might be sweeping or clearing an area or conducting a manhunt, meaning it seeks to use the utmost precision in its application of force. If I may presume: the terrorists have learned fire and movement from us, from watching us, and from reading our manuals, which are posted online. But our tactics are not geared toward indiscriminate slaughter. The question is, will they develop any tactical innovations that allow them that advantage?


I’ve received email requests to show a YouTube clip of the Val Kilmer/Robert de Niro “buddy pair” from Heat, which illustrates the concept of mutual support. — W.


I am intrigued by the inclusion of the "buddy-team" you-tube clip from the movie HEAT with this article. I have been showing the HEAT video clip to my law enforcement classes for several years.

Initially my emphasis was solely to demonstrate the fundamental need for precision shot placement, which is the core of my training program. In the clip this is demonstrated by the Kilmer and DeNiro characters initially, then subsequently by the Pacino character on Sizemore. But about a year ago the effectiveness of the disciplined DeNiro/Kilmer "buddy-team" against a numerically overwhelming but disorganized police force hit me like a brick between the eyes. Since then I have been emphasizing to everyone I train that we in law enforcement have an urgent need to train our people for rehearsed as well as extemporaneous "buddy-team" fighting because whether the offenders are a pair of disaffected teens, armed bank robbers, or jihadist terrorists, the tactics required to counter the threat are EXACTLY THE SAME.

The final point I would make is that unlike military units, law enforcement personnel face a much higher probability that dealing with an active shooter(s) situation will require them to fight alongside a person who is not their dedicated "buddy-team" partner; in fact, they may have never met before, may not have commonality of weapons, or even of ammunition! To make this work on any level–national, state, or regional–presents us with a daunting task. This sort of preparedness requires a high degree of commonality of training within and between agencies such that any two officers responding to an active shooter call can rapidly default to the same base rules of engagement and comms and proceed forthwith.

American law enforcement needs to be moving in this direction. Much as I want to believe that our local, state, and federal agencies will rise to the occasion, experience has taught me that institutional inertia (the resistance of large organizations to change) will preclude such a move. It is up to the rank and file, the Warriors who have chosen to Protect and Serve, to recognize the need for this level of preparedness. They will need to forge alliances, form training programs at a grassroots level, and implement that training.

The alternative is annihilation.

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Caliber Wars: The Blame Game



Caliber Wars: The Blame Game

I am frequently asked some variation of this question: "My department issues such-and-such ammunition for our WonderAuto issue sidearms. I’m worried that this caliber/bullet/gun won’t get the job done. What do you recommend?"

My answer has to be predicated on the understanding that I am NOT a ballistics expert. I’ve studied a lot of the terminal ballistics literature, have seen, treated, and reviewed a LOT of gunshot wounds, but I am not an engineer or ballistician. I defer to the works of such leading lights as Duncan MacPherson and Gary Roberts when the discussion centers on the performance of ballistic projectiles in flesh.

However, when it comes to the "performance" of flesh when struck by ballistic projectiles, I do have some significant experience.

And when it comes to the effects of service caliber handgun bullets on flesh and bone, I have formed the confirmed opinion that where the bullet is placed is far more important than which bullet, caliber, or platform you use.   

Dr. Gary Roberts kindly permitted me to reproduce the following photo:









This photo is actually a digital composite of photos of several ballistic gelatin blocks. As you can readily see, all 6 bullets penetrated the FBI required minimum of 12", and not penetrated deeper than 14". All the bullets expanded as advertised.  

Keep in mind that service caliber handgun projectiles create a temporary cavity, but the velocity of expansion of the temporary cavity is much less than that of high-velocity rifle projectiles, and as such do not contribute to wound effectiveness to any real degree. So when we talk about handgun wounding effects, we’re talking about the damage caused by the permanent or "crush" cavity created by the path of the bullet through tissue. 

Wound Track Geometry 

If you visualize the "wound tracks", or the permanent cavities created by each bullet in gelatin as cylinders, we can calculate the nominal surface area—or as I like to call it, the bleeding area—of each wound track by use of the simple formula: 

                        S.A. = pDH  

Where D is the diameter of the permanent cavity, and H is the length of the wound track. D will vary as the bullet expands, but for the sake of simplicity let’s assume D equals the expanded diameter of the bullet. By this method we see that the bleeding area of the 9mm wound is: 

                        B.A. = p x 0.61" x 13" 

                               = 24.9 sq. in.  

And the bleeding are of the .45 ACP wound is 

                        B.A. = p x 0.84" x 13" 

                               =34.29 sq. in.  

The bleeding area of the 9mm wound is 74% the size of the .45 ACP wound, or put another way, the amount of bleeding caused by the .45 ACP bullet is about 25% more than that caused by the 9mm bullet.

In other words, you’re not getting a whole heckuva lot more wounding potential with the .45 ACP than you do with the 9mm. Both calibers, if shot into vital target areas, are going to cause catastrophic damage. But both calibers, if shot into non-vital areas, are going to cause equally trivial damage.  

So what’s the point of caliber wars?  

What indeed? Research has shown that the differences in wounding effectiveness of the various currently accepted service handgun calibers is roughly equivalent. 

But what seems to happen over and over again is that an agency has an officer-involved shooting (OIS) in which the outcome was suboptimal… basically, the offender didn’t collapse in a shower of blood & brains instantaneously… and then the powers that be in that agency then look for SOMETHING to blame for the failure to incapacitate (FTI). 

In the hundreds of OISs I’ve reviewed, by far the predominant cause of FTI is that police handgun bullets didn’t penetrate/perforate any of the offender’s vital internal organs.

“But we shot the guy twice in the head!” one police administrator complained to me.

“Right,” I replied. “One shot through the left cheek that exited in front of the ear on the same side, and one shot through the other ear. Both were superficial wounds.”

"No matter," the administrator told me. The cause of the FTI was clearly, to his mind, the "substandard" issued ammunition (.40 S&W 180 gr GDHP, the same bullet that has accounted for 23 successful OISs in a metropolitan police department I’ve worked with closely over the past 3 years… and 19 of those 23 offenders ceased utilizing valuable atmospheric oxygen).
The agency in question has since switched to .45 ACP as their issue caliber, and a new handgun that accommodates this round, necessitating replacement of the agency’s entire inventory of handguns, holsters, magazine carriers, etc… at a huge cost to the taxpayer.
I tried to convince that agency’s Command Staff that they would be better served by investing that money in training, but the decision had already been made. I am not optimistic about the likelihood that this agency’s next OIS will be any more successful than its last one.