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Season’s Greetings

Christmas is almost here, and soon we will be bidding goodbye to 2009. Good riddance, I might say, given the events that have transpired in the past year. I am reminded of the ancient Chinese curse: "May you live in interesting times".

For we are, indeed, living in interesting times. In 2009 we’ve seen the United States federal deficit increase exponentially as a runaway tax-and-spend Congress has plunged us into unprecedented debt. We have seen our economy teeter on the brink of collapse (and some say we’re still teetering…). We have watched as Korea and Iran race to develop nuclear weapons and delivery systems while our do-nothing President apologizes to the World for the "bad behavior" of the United States. And that same President somehow managed to nearly-simultanously escalate the war in Afghanistan and collect a Nobel Peace Prize.

Pandemic H1N1 Influenza ran amok in 2009, causing more panic than anything else, although the death toll was not insignificant. The federal government is about to take over the health care system in the United States; given the government’s record of creating runaway bureaucracies such as the Veterans Administration and the Social Security Administration (either of which could be the poster child for poor service and rampant inefficiency) I am gravely pessimistic about the future of health care in America.

But amid all this gloom and doom, I have to admit there have been some great moments for me in 2009. Despite tight training budgets, we were able to conduct almost as many Tactical Anatomy classes in 2009 as we did in 2008. More cops attended TAS courses in 2009 on their own dime than in any previous year, which tells me two things: first, that this training is needed in the law enforcement community, and second, that there are a lot of dedicated trainers out there who will stop at nothing to make sure their people get the best training they can find. To all those dedicated instructors, I want to say thank you, and don’t give up doing what you do. Officers’ lives depend on you.

I wish all of you a very Merry Christmas, and a happy and safe New Year. Here’s hoping 2010 turns out to be a great year.

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Nashville Class Registration Problems

Several people have contacted me to let me know that they are having problems registering for the November "Shooting With Xray Vision" class and/or the "Tactical Treatment of Gunshot Wounds" class to be held in the first week of November at Nashville.

I am at a loss to explain these problems, as some folks have registered with no difficulty at all. It may be a server-to-server communication problem, and my webmaster is looking into it.

If anyone is having difficulty using the website registration, you can mail your information (name, email address, snailmail address, telephone number, and agency, along with a check or money order for your tuition to: Tactical Anatomy Systems LLC, P.O. Box 183, Ripon, WI, 54971. I will email confirmation of receipt of your registration when I get it.

Doc

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Classes & Communications

I recently conducted a TAS "Shooting With Xray Vision for Civilians" class in Saukville, WI. Attendance was sparse (something a lot of independent instructors have been noting during the current economic downturn) but a surprisingly large number of cops were in attendance. Because of the small class size, we had a very interactive time together, with plenty of Q&A and discussion around the room. We’ll be holding another one of these classes in the New Year, again in Saukville.

I am in discussions with a top-drawer trainer who works for a federal agency and is a first-rate instructor at one of our nation’s finest independent training facilities… regarding the possibility of conducting a 2-day Tactical Treatment of Gunshot Wounds class in the Milwaukee area. If it comes together, we will be opening the class up to local LE personnel to fill a maximum class size of 25. This class is designed primarily for tactical team/SWAT operators who want to know more about how to effectively treat trauma in the tactical (hot zone) environment.

Communications:  we’ve added a lot of new members to this site in the past few weeks, which is great. Unfortunately, I have not been able to notify several of you that your membership/login has been activated because your agency email addresses are spam-blocking my emails. I suggest that anyone registering with tacticalanatomy.com use a non-agency email address when they register.

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223/5.56 Duty/Defense Ammunition Selection

I must apologize to Members and other readers of this site for my inattention to the site of late. June has been a heavy month, with two major conferences to attend/speak at, as well as a lot of demands on my time at work. How is it that when the economy goes sour, people start doing more things that land them in my Emergency Department? Is it something akin to the full moon?

Inquiring minds want to know!!!

Anyways, enough whining… Today I was notified by my great friend Dr. Gary Roberts that I had been referenced on an internet gun forum. The writer, who has apparently taken one of my classes or heard one of my lectures, ascribed to me certain expertise in "terminal ballistics" that he felt superseded the ballistics testing done by the FBI.  I hastened to set the record straight… I have never claimed to know more than those jello junkies at the FBI ballistics labs!!! They do good work down there in Quantico, and better yet, they freely share it with the rest of us. 

But I must state explicitly here (as I do in all my classes) that I am NOT a terminal ballistics expert, nor do I do much terminal ballistics testing myself. I rely heavily on the bench testing done by people like Dr. Gary Roberts in this area. My expertise is much more in the area of terminal effects, i.e., showing people what the anticipated effects of their well-targeted rounds might be. As such I train people where to shoot the bad guys, and via my trauma medicine background, what kinds of effects one can expect when a person is shot in one of the major zones of incapacitation.

The problem, as you may be aware if you’ve attended one of my classes, is that in gunfights our opponents rarely stand up to us foursquare with their guns at the hip and let us shoot them in the high mediastinum. In many, many gunfights I have in my files, the offender presented LEOs with a bladed or crouching or some other contorted stance which bears no resemblance to qualification and training targets. Shot placement suffered accordingly as the LEOs in question had no training on these "non-traditional" presentations. As Dr. Roberts has so ably pointed out on many occasions, the problem your bullets have to solve may require much, much more than 12 inches of penetration.

Example: in the 1986 FBI Miami gunfight, bank robber and murderer Michael Platt shot Agent Ed Mireles in the right (dominant) forearm with a round of 5.56. This round shredded Mireles’ forearm and permanently disabled him. However, the bullet failed to penetrate through the arm and into Mireles’ torso. As such, Mireles was able to continue, using his nondominant hand with both his Remington 870 and his S&W revolver, and ultimately put the final bullets into Platt that finished the fight.

If Platt’s rifle had been loaded with a bonded-core or partition-style bullet designed for deep penetration even through intermediate barriers, Mireles likely would have been much more seriously injured, if not killed.

In my medical experience and in my big game hunting experience, penetration is a good thing. I have not been greatly impressed with the terminal effects (not to be confused with terminal ballistics, BTW) of most frangible rounds on human/live animal targets. Tthis does not include, of course, small varmint game such as prairie dogs and woodchucks. I have little faith in the incapacitating effect of any round’s temporary cavitation effect, whether it be a handgun or rifle–50 BMG being a possible exception. What counts in gunshot wounds is, quite simply, what vital organs has the bullet penetrated/perforated, and how catastrophically. On the other hand, I’ve not been impressed with the terminal effectiveness of the deep penetration afforded by our military 62 gr steel-tipped armor-penetrating ammo, which is too often a remote-control cordless drill.

The clear answer is that for general patrol/defensive rifle duty, we want a round that both expands well and penetrates deeply, while maintaining reliable functionality and accuracy. This is the ideal.

That being said, and no disrespect intended to any of the runners-up, my personal and professional 5.56 ammunition choices based on the recommendations of true experts like Dr. Roberts–and my own experience on live animals and tissue simulants–tend to run along the lines of Federal TRU 55/62gr bonded, Black Hills/Nosler Partition 65 gr, and Winchester JSP 64 gr. These rounds will defeat intermediate barriers and will penetrate deeply through tissue, and will work accurately in barrels from 1:7 through 1:10. All of these rounds have an excellent record in OIS’s over many, many years, and as such I have no reservation in recommending them.

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ILEETA Report: Features of the Active Killer

I recently attended the annual conference of the International Law Enforcement Educators and Trainers Association (ILEETA) in Wheeling, IL. As it has been since I first attended in 2005, it was an outstanding meeting.

I had the privilege of sitting on the "Panel of Experts on Use of Deadly Force", moderated by Massad Ayoob. As usual, this was a lively discussion forum with a lot of good input from the panel and from the floor. One of the most interesting topics brought up was and update from Ron Borsch on his research into the features of "active killers".  Ron manages the South East Area Law Enforcement (SEALE) Regional Training Academy in Bedford, OH, and has been researching features of active killer incidents for a number of years.

Ron believes the "active shooter" term commonly used by the media and by law enforcement is inaccurate, pejorative and prejudicial against law-abiding firearms users, and potentially dangerous to law enforcement personnel. As he correctly points out, a law-abiding citizen shooting trap or punching holes in targets on his back 40 is an "active shooter": he is actively shooting, and doing so completely within the limits of the law! Ron quite reasonably argues that  the term "active shooter" needs to be replaced by "active killer", because the latter term conveys the essence of the deranged murderer and his actions in two succinct words. I agree. We need to get the message out to fellow LEOs and to the media that this terminology needs to change.

Borsch defines an active killer as a mass murderer (4 or more victims are intentionally murdered in the same episode and location) whose acts take place in no more than 20 minutes. This definition encompasses every active killer event since Charles Whitman’s rifle rampage at the University of Texas in 1966, and including the Columbine High School horror, among others. Borsch has analyzed almost 100 incidents. Borsch’s research shows that the modus operandi of active killers has remained consistent through time, and this knowledge has shaped his training for LEOs.

Borsch’s research reveals a number of critical features of active killers. First, they almost always act alone (98% of cases). Second, their primary objective is to produce as high a body count as possible in a short period of time; they commit as many as 8 murders/attempted murders per minute during their rampages. Borsch relates this high rate of killing in his metaphoric "stopwatch of death": the active killer knows that police will respond, and he has only minutes to cause as many deaths as possible. The active killer fears police, or in fact any form of armed resistance. When police or armed citizens show up, the active killer takes his own life in 90% of incidents. Active killers are "dynamic and quick" (average duration of attacks post-Columbine is less than 8 minutes), almost never take hostages, and they do not negotiate. In 80% of cases active killers have used long guns (rifles or shotguns), and 75% of active killers bring multiple firearms to the scene. 

Borsch has used his data to formulate a training program and policy template that encourages the first responding officers to an active killer call to make immediate entry to the location. As Borsch states, "The incident may well be over by the time police arrive. But with some of these subjects attempting as many as 8 murders a minute, we don’t have the luxury of waiting for backup before entering. These are extraordinary events that warrant an extraordinary response."

Borsch’s training emphasizes the first responding officer making rapid entry into the location, with weapon(s) out and ready for immediate deployment. The active killer is unlikely to return fire on police officers, but also is highly unlikely to respond positively to verbal warnings or to negotiate. Officers need to be prepared to shoot immediately when the subject is encountered. Since active killers are increasingly resorting to wearing body armor, responding officers should be aware that multiple upper torso/head shots may be required to stop the carnage. A patrol rifle/carbine or shotgun is the preferred LEO entry weapon.

Borsch cites the recent actions of officer Justin Garner, who earlier this year responded to an active killer call at a nursing home in North Carolina, as an exemplar. By the time Garner entered the building, the subject had murdered 7 elderly residents and a nurse in a matter of only a few minutes. Garner encountered the subject as he was reloading his shotgun. Garner terminated the encounter with one shot to the subject’s upper chest with his service sidearm.

Of significant note, Borsch’s study reveals that only 6 active killer incidents have been successfully terminated in progress by LEOs. Most successful terminations were the product of courageous action on the part of private citizens, most often unarmed. However, it should be noted that nearly every active killer incident on record in the USA has occurred in so-called "gun-free" or "zero weapons tolerance" zones such as shopping malls, office buildings, and schools. It should come as no surprise to most of us that these zones are highly attractive to the active killer, as he is more likely to be able to execute his high body count plan than he would be in, say, a police station or gunshop!

More on the absurdity of "gun-free" zones, particularly schools, to follow in my next blog article.

 

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Tactical Anatomy Adopted by Milwaukee PD

Last week I had the opportunity to pay a visit to the Firearms Training Unit of the City of Milwaukee Police Department. I have had the privilege of working with Sgt. (newly promoted to Lieutenant) Jim "Mac" MacGillis and his instructor staff on a number of occasions over the past 4 years. All of the fulltime instructors have taken my Tactical Anatomy training, with four officers having completed my 2-day Advanced Instructor Development course last year.

Milwaukee PD’s officers have one of the best hit ratios of any large police department I am aware of. Moreover, their success rate in Officer-Involved Shootings (OIS) has been extremely positive (for the officers, anyway). Mac and his staff have used some innovative training methods to really ensure that MPD coppers can put their 180 gr Gold Dot Hollow Point bullets where they count. This training has involved the use of a great training/qualification target that encourages good shot placement in real life, effective use of the IES MILO computer simulator, shooter problem diagnostics programs, force on force training, and so on. This is one switched-on department when it comes to firearms training.

They’ve now developed a new inservice program for veteran officers that is strongly based on the 3D anatomic targeting skills contained in Tactical Anatomy Systems’  training. They’re using many of the Powerpoint slides from my Tactical Anatomy Instructor Manual, with some really good slides of their own making (that I intend to "borrow" for my upcoming talks at ILEETA and IALEFI!). Then they take to the firing range, where they’re using remote-controlled robotic movers with Tactical Ted-type 3D targets mounted on them. Mac and his staff run the trainees through progressively more difficult targeting problems, individually and as two-man "buddy teams" (see members-only section for more discussion of this).

"When they come in and see what we want them to do, most of our coppers are pretty nervous," Mac says. "But by the end of the training they know they can hit where it counts from any angle, on moving targets, and while moving themselves. They leave here with a huge boost of confidence in their ability with their handguns."

It’s a huge boost of confidence for me and for Tactical Anatomy Systems, too, because this marks the first time a metro police department has officially made Tactical Anatomy a major part of its firearms training program. I feel pretty good about this, as MPD’s adoption of my training means that by the end of the current training cycle every one of MPD’s patrol officers  will have learned 3D target organ visualization and will be able to put their bullets where they are critically needed when the fecal matter hits the rotating cooling device. Milwaukee’s excellent OIS record can only get better with this extra training. In fact, there has been one OIS by a TAS-trained MPD officer already, and it was an unqualified success: one shot at 40 feet ended the fight instantly and permanently.

Next week I am going back for a second visit, and I’m going to actually take the 4-hour block of training from Mac and his staff alongside the class of MPD officers. I’ll be posting photos and (hopefully) video of the training in the Members Only section.  

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Battlefield Trauma Care – Nashville March 11

Tactical medicine has become a buzzword in the law enforcement community in the past few years… but like many new concepts, it means different things to different people. Depending on who you take the class from and where, the curriculum can vary enormously, and the quality of the instruction can be anything from cutting edge to dull and disinterested.

Tactical Anatomy SystemsTM is offering our basic (4-hr) Battlefield Trauma Care class in conjunction with our Advanced Instructor class in Nashville on March 11. This class was developed over several years taking into account my training and experience as a certified Emergency Physician, EMS Medical Director, and after taking the tactical medicine classes offered by colleagues around the country. I am not too pround to say that as a physician I have learned a huge amount of field medicine from guys with basic medic training who have had to use their training under enemy fire.

The terms "tactical medicine" and "tactical emergency medical services" bug me… I don’t think they really tell the listener/reader what the course or discipline is about. I like "battlefield trauma care" (BTC)  or "combat trauma care" because they speak to the crux of what most of us in the TEMS field are trying to do: train non-medical personnel how to do the necessary things to survive combat trauma during the firefight and immediately thereafter.

So what does Tactical Anatomy ‘s  BTC training consist of? To be honest, it depends on how much time you allot for training, and what the level of skill and training the class has going in. My most basic BTC class is a 4-hour block that covers the basic principles of field treatment of gunshot wounds, edged weapons wounds, and blast trauma, with hands-on practical exercises in using the basic survival tools that every soldier or cop should have on hand in a violent confrontation. If we have a more advanced group with more time, we’ll go into more advanced scenario-based training incorporating simulated wounds and simulated-fire and live-fire environments. 

The next scheduled Battlefield Trauma Care class (4-hr block) on our books will be held in Nashville on March 11, 2009. Tuition is $145 and includes a basic trauma kit for each trainee. Register by clicking the caddy button below and following the instructions (credit card), or if you wish to pay by check or department purchase order, contact me through the "Contact" button on this website and I’ll email you the info you need to sign up.  

{simplecaddy code=BTCNashville}

 

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A Brush With Death

 

My commute to work is 48 miles each way. My usual route is on a 2-lane state highway and a couple of 2-lane county roads. Traffic is light and the rural scenery is beautiful.
 
Two days ago Wisconsin was hit by a snowstorm, and two days prior to that we had freezing rain. The result was atrocious driving conditions, so I decided to skip my usual route and take the alternative, which follows three different 4-lane highways.
 
Big mistake. The 4-lane roads were no better plowed/salted than my usual 2-lane roads are, and traffic was heavy. Clots of slow-traveling vehicles (30 mph) created as much hazard as the idiots doing 75 mph. I had my cruise control set at 50, which in my vehicle was a safe speed for the conditions.
 
I had just passed a clot of 3 or 4 vehicles and moved back into the right lane when I came to a highway overpass. As I came over the crest, I was horrified to see a spun-out vehicle stalled in my lane facing oncoming traffic. The steep grade of the overpass had prevented seeing him in time, and I realized I was going to hit him head-on at 50 mph. I pulled the steering wheel to the left and simultaneously hit the brakes, hard, hoping to avoid the inevitable collision. The antilock brake system chattered like an Uzi on full auto, but the Blizzak Snow & Ice tires gripped the road as advertised, and my car pulled into the left lane. I may have brushed the stalled vehicle with my rear bumper, but I didn’t feel an impact. However, the violence of my maneuver put me into a clockwise spin.
 
A spin at 50 mph on icy roads is no treat. I slid into the concrete median divider butt-first, striking a glancing blow with my right rear quarter, and that impact spun me back across the highway counter-clockwise. I hit the steel guard rail hard (again with my right rear quarter panel). I struggled to get the car pointing the right direction, knowing that if I came to a stop facing any other direction I would almost certainly be hit by one of the following vehicles. I was still doing 30 mph when I got the car under control. I looked into my rearview mirror and was horrified to see three or four vehicles spinning down the overpass toward me, all out of control.
 
As I hadn’t hit another vehicle, and in my estimation stopping there would almost certainly result in being hit by another out-of-control vehicle, I continued on. I tried to report the accident on my cell phone, but the county dispatch officer asked me to call back later as they were swamped with emergency calls at that time. I did so, and learned that 14 vehicles had crashed as a result of that single spun-out vehicle on the overpass. I was unhurt, but several people had to be transported to the regional trauma center.
 
The lessons that can be drawn from this incident are potentially life-saving. If you live in the South, you may want to skip this blog. But if you live in country where it snows/freezes, you may want to pay attention.
 
As and ER doc I have more than passing familiarity with motor vehicle collisions (MVC) and the damage they can do to people. MVCs, which are nearly always accidental or negligent in character, killed 43,667 Americans in 2005 (most recent year full data are available). By contrast, firearms deaths accounted for 30,694 deaths, and the majority of these were suicides and homicides. In the same year approximately 100 law enforcement officers died from gunshot wounds, yet nearly four times as many died in MVCs.
 
Not surprisingly, winter driving conditions dramatically escalate the number of MVCs. But there are things you can do to reduce the likelihood of being in a crash, and if you do have a wreck, reduce the chance of injury. I’ve been following these steps for years and it’s kept me out of an accident for more than a decade. Two days ago, I believe they likely saved my life.
 
First: don’t drive a vehicle that is unsafe. Pickup trucks are notoriously unsafe vehicles (as it happens, the stalled vehicle I narrowly avoided hitting was a pickup), and your chance of being killed in a pickup crash are nearly twice as high as if you’re driving a sedan or station wagon. Why is that? Because trucks have a higher center of gravity, and they most of their weight in the front. As a result they are prone to rollover and spinning out of control. Moreover, the legally mandated crash protection standards in passenger cars don’t apply to pickups or SUVs. Fullsize SUVs are, by the way, just as bad as pickup trucks, because they’re built on truck chassis and have the same high center of gravity and poor front-to-back weight distribution. Four-wheel drive and all-wheel drive does NOT make trucks any safer. In fact, they make them less safe because the IBTW (Idiot Behind The Wheel) falsely assumes his/her 4WD will allow faster speeds on slippery roads.
 
Second: the term “All-Season Radial Tires” is bovine excrement. ASR’s are fine in spring, summer, and fall, but they suck in snow and on ice. Numerous studies have shown that a good Snow-and-Ice (SI) tire will keep you on the road when everybody else is in the ditch or behind a tow truck. SI tires have a more aggressive tread that sheds snow, while ASRs’ treads pack with snow and become effectively “bald”. Moreover, SI tires are made of a softer, stickier rubber compound. This reduces their wear life if driven on warm pavement, but it allows them to stick to icy surfaces. Bridgestone’s Blizzak tires have been my standard winter footwear on all my vehicles for 10 years. In that time none of my vehicles have been in a winter MVC, until this week.
 
Third: learn to drive in unstable conditions. Various auto clubs provide winter driving courses. Another good option is to take a race driving class, such as the excellent Bob Bondurant courses offered around the country. You’ll learn an awful lot about handling a car in a skid from Bondurant’s instructors.
 
In my MVC two days ago, I was saved from death or serious injury by these three things. I was driving my Chrysler 300M, which is equipped with Blizzaks, a sport suspension/steering package that makes it far more responsive than most cars and a very good ABS system, and I’ve taken Bondurant’s course. If any of the three had been absent, I’d have hit that pickup and if I hadn’t been killed, my legs would probably be shattered and I would have sustained significant chest, abdomen, or pelvic trauma.
 
But if I’d been driving my Blizzak-equipped Subaru (which my daughter was using that day), I not only would have avoided the collision, but I would probably have maintained stability and wouldn’t have even hit the guardrail.
 
As it happens, I’ve been looking into replacing my Chrysler with a Subaru Forester recently. Once I get the bodywork done on the 300, I’m selling it. And next week I’m picking up my new Forester.
 

Anybody want to buy a Chrysler 300M Special Sport?

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“Buddy-Team” Tactics

12/1/2008

"Buddy-team" Terrorist Tactics at Mumbai

 

This link to this article written by a U.S. Marine officer was sent to me by email. I believe there is enormous tactical value in this article:

From what I can gather there are a few interesting observations to be made of the tactics in use in Mumbai:

It appears the attackers were organized into buddy pairs, allowing one to shoot while the other moved, and so forth. Interestingly, the buddy pair has is a later innovation in small unit tactics and has only been slow to trickle through regular infantry formations. In World War I, the smallest element of maneuver (on paper) might have been a battalion or company. The Germans, in developing “storm troop tactics” then innovated even smaller maneuver elements, which we might call squads today. The role of platoons and squads became only greater in WWII. After WWII, General S.L.A. Marshall conducted a massive study of the reactions of men in combat (See “Men Against Fire”) and the result of his work was the genesis of the Fire Team. The Fire Team is now the smallest doctrinal unit of maneuver in the US military. In the Marine Corps, it is led by a Corporal, includes an automatic rifleman with a Squad Automatic Weapon, and two more riflemen.

During the Iraq War, two innovations have taken place: first, within the Marine Corps, the concept of the “buddy pair” or “buddy team” has spread dramatically, though it is still not doctrinal (it should be). The idea may have begun in the special forces, though I am not sure. The advantage of smaller and smaller units of maneuver is that if they rehearse their actions and build cohesion within the unit, they develop ever greater levels of capability *at that level*. A well-trained buddy pair with the right mindset and enough ammo can take over a city block, house by house, while under fire. The other innovation that has taken place in Iraq is to take the Fire Team and make it into a motorized element, inside one vehicle. This is less in favor now that everyone realizes that moving around in vehicles makes you seem more like robots to the locals and they then have less of a problem with killing you. In any case, all of these changes have one large thing in common — a decentralizing of decisionmaking and maneuver.

 

And now in Mumbai it would seem we have seen the ultimate result: autonomous buddy-pairs, with a great deal of rehearsals and navigation practice, each with its own set of goals, possibly redundant comms with brevity codes. I would imagine that each team had multiple preplanned routes to each of its objectives before they finally converged on the location for the last stand. Along the way, as some have wondered, they may have stopped for quick logistics reloads of ammo and water.

Here are some thoughts, in no order:

1. The school shooting at Columbine springs to mind when looking for analogies.

2. One of the advantages of a buddy pair, as mentioned above, is the ability to fire and move. One fires while the other moves, and then they switch. In this way, moving from cover to cover, they take ground. But this concept becomes interesting when considered against the fact that the terrorists seemingly had no one firing against them, and they did not have to disciplined in taking well-aimed shots . . .

3. . . . A photographer noted how “cool” and “professional” they looked as they sprayed from the hip. Shooting from the hip is not extremely professional, but this only is if one wants to take well-aimed shots. Perhaps shooting from the hip is very professional if one wants to spray in across a broad angle while maintaining a wider field of view than if behind the sights of your weapon. In other words, if facing no armed opposition, you have the luxury of spraying broadly, and the most dangerous thing to you is an armed threat that comes from outside your narrowed peripheral vision while using your iron sights.

4. Note this sentence, from the AP article: “They weren’t aiming at anyone in particular. It was like they wanted to empty their magazines and do as much damage here as possible before heading to the Taj,” I would argue that the terrorists, while being superbly motivated, and having planned intricately for their assault, are nevertheless poor marksmen. Given the details that we are learning of their attack, the most surprising thing is that more people weren’t killed.

5. It seems that there is a convergence taking place within the realm of small-unit tactics. Infantry units, terrorists, police forces, criminal and narco-gangs, and so forth are all converging in terms of the tactics they use against one another. The only tactical difference between 5 terrorist buddy pairs and a Marine rifle squad is their goal: the former seeks a position to create the most carnage indiscriminately for the longest period of time while the latter might be sweeping or clearing an area or conducting a manhunt, meaning it seeks to use the utmost precision in its application of force. If I may presume: the terrorists have learned fire and movement from us, from watching us, and from reading our manuals, which are posted online. But our tactics are not geared toward indiscriminate slaughter. The question is, will they develop any tactical innovations that allow them that advantage?

Update

I’ve received email requests to show a YouTube clip of the Val Kilmer/Robert de Niro “buddy pair” from Heat, which illustrates the concept of mutual support. — W.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZdV63b4VkrM&feature=related

 

I am intrigued by the inclusion of the "buddy-team" you-tube clip from the movie HEAT with this article. I have been showing the HEAT video clip to my law enforcement classes for several years.

Initially my emphasis was solely to demonstrate the fundamental need for precision shot placement, which is the core of my training program. In the clip this is demonstrated by the Kilmer and DeNiro characters initially, then subsequently by the Pacino character on Sizemore. But about a year ago the effectiveness of the disciplined DeNiro/Kilmer "buddy-team" against a numerically overwhelming but disorganized police force hit me like a brick between the eyes. Since then I have been emphasizing to everyone I train that we in law enforcement have an urgent need to train our people for rehearsed as well as extemporaneous "buddy-team" fighting because whether the offenders are a pair of disaffected teens, armed bank robbers, or jihadist terrorists, the tactics required to counter the threat are EXACTLY THE SAME.

The final point I would make is that unlike military units, law enforcement personnel face a much higher probability that dealing with an active shooter(s) situation will require them to fight alongside a person who is not their dedicated "buddy-team" partner; in fact, they may have never met before, may not have commonality of weapons, or even of ammunition! To make this work on any level–national, state, or regional–presents us with a daunting task. This sort of preparedness requires a high degree of commonality of training within and between agencies such that any two officers responding to an active shooter call can rapidly default to the same base rules of engagement and comms and proceed forthwith.

American law enforcement needs to be moving in this direction. Much as I want to believe that our local, state, and federal agencies will rise to the occasion, experience has taught me that institutional inertia (the resistance of large organizations to change) will preclude such a move. It is up to the rank and file, the Warriors who have chosen to Protect and Serve, to recognize the need for this level of preparedness. They will need to forge alliances, form training programs at a grassroots level, and implement that training.

The alternative is annihilation.

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Caliber Wars: The Blame Game

 

11/1/2008

Caliber Wars: The Blame Game

I am frequently asked some variation of this question: "My department issues such-and-such ammunition for our WonderAuto issue sidearms. I’m worried that this caliber/bullet/gun won’t get the job done. What do you recommend?"

My answer has to be predicated on the understanding that I am NOT a ballistics expert. I’ve studied a lot of the terminal ballistics literature, have seen, treated, and reviewed a LOT of gunshot wounds, but I am not an engineer or ballistician. I defer to the works of such leading lights as Duncan MacPherson and Gary Roberts when the discussion centers on the performance of ballistic projectiles in flesh.

However, when it comes to the "performance" of flesh when struck by ballistic projectiles, I do have some significant experience.

And when it comes to the effects of service caliber handgun bullets on flesh and bone, I have formed the confirmed opinion that where the bullet is placed is far more important than which bullet, caliber, or platform you use.   

Dr. Gary Roberts kindly permitted me to reproduce the following photo:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

This photo is actually a digital composite of photos of several ballistic gelatin blocks. As you can readily see, all 6 bullets penetrated the FBI required minimum of 12", and not penetrated deeper than 14". All the bullets expanded as advertised.  

Keep in mind that service caliber handgun projectiles create a temporary cavity, but the velocity of expansion of the temporary cavity is much less than that of high-velocity rifle projectiles, and as such do not contribute to wound effectiveness to any real degree. So when we talk about handgun wounding effects, we’re talking about the damage caused by the permanent or "crush" cavity created by the path of the bullet through tissue. 

Wound Track Geometry 

If you visualize the "wound tracks", or the permanent cavities created by each bullet in gelatin as cylinders, we can calculate the nominal surface area—or as I like to call it, the bleeding area—of each wound track by use of the simple formula: 

                        S.A. = pDH  

Where D is the diameter of the permanent cavity, and H is the length of the wound track. D will vary as the bullet expands, but for the sake of simplicity let’s assume D equals the expanded diameter of the bullet. By this method we see that the bleeding area of the 9mm wound is: 

                        B.A. = p x 0.61" x 13" 

                               = 24.9 sq. in.  

And the bleeding are of the .45 ACP wound is 

                        B.A. = p x 0.84" x 13" 

                               =34.29 sq. in.  

The bleeding area of the 9mm wound is 74% the size of the .45 ACP wound, or put another way, the amount of bleeding caused by the .45 ACP bullet is about 25% more than that caused by the 9mm bullet.

In other words, you’re not getting a whole heckuva lot more wounding potential with the .45 ACP than you do with the 9mm. Both calibers, if shot into vital target areas, are going to cause catastrophic damage. But both calibers, if shot into non-vital areas, are going to cause equally trivial damage.  

So what’s the point of caliber wars?  

What indeed? Research has shown that the differences in wounding effectiveness of the various currently accepted service handgun calibers is roughly equivalent. 

But what seems to happen over and over again is that an agency has an officer-involved shooting (OIS) in which the outcome was suboptimal… basically, the offender didn’t collapse in a shower of blood & brains instantaneously… and then the powers that be in that agency then look for SOMETHING to blame for the failure to incapacitate (FTI). 

In the hundreds of OISs I’ve reviewed, by far the predominant cause of FTI is that police handgun bullets didn’t penetrate/perforate any of the offender’s vital internal organs.

“But we shot the guy twice in the head!” one police administrator complained to me.

“Right,” I replied. “One shot through the left cheek that exited in front of the ear on the same side, and one shot through the other ear. Both were superficial wounds.”

"No matter," the administrator told me. The cause of the FTI was clearly, to his mind, the "substandard" issued ammunition (.40 S&W 180 gr GDHP, the same bullet that has accounted for 23 successful OISs in a metropolitan police department I’ve worked with closely over the past 3 years… and 19 of those 23 offenders ceased utilizing valuable atmospheric oxygen).
 
The agency in question has since switched to .45 ACP as their issue caliber, and a new handgun that accommodates this round, necessitating replacement of the agency’s entire inventory of handguns, holsters, magazine carriers, etc… at a huge cost to the taxpayer.
 
I tried to convince that agency’s Command Staff that they would be better served by investing that money in training, but the decision had already been made. I am not optimistic about the likelihood that this agency’s next OIS will be any more successful than its last one.